

Framing Effect: To Frame, or to Be Framed

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Manuscript received September 25, 2023; revised December 19, 2023; accepted March 1, 2024; published July 9, 2024.

Abstract—The framing effect has long been considered one of the studies of the irrational decision-making of the human decision. However, people concluded that this view is based on the study of a specific strong judgment, which is used to convey, and present given options with digital representation for the expectation of quantifiers, collectively known as accurate values. Research shows that in our daily lives and decision-making, we sometimes make irrational, biased decisions influenced by many factors, including how the decision was made. Many studies have shown that people usually make decisions within the framework of their expectations, and the outcome of the decision is within that framework, a phenomenon known as the framing effect. The term framing effect first appeared in prospect theory. Now, the framing effect has been applied to decisions made by different subjects in a variety of situations, for example, financial decision-making, management and organization studies, political decisions and medical decision-making.

Keywords—framing effect, prospect theory, political decision-making, medical decision-making

I. INTRODUCTION

Highlight Frame refers to the people of a problem forming a particular conceptualization or repositioning their thinking process of a problem. The main premise of framing theory is that for a certain issue, people can make multiple interpretations from different perspectives, make it have multiple values and give it multiple meanings (Chong and Druckman, 2007).

Nowadays, framing effects have been widely used in various fields, especially social and behavioral sciences. In traditional sociological research, Irving Goffman argued that frameworks are powerful tools to help people better understand the world. In his view, framing is a cultural constraint that helps deepen our understanding and thus reduces the complexity of our understanding of the world. In the psychological tradition, Kahneman and Tversky's work is often considered the beginning. They proposed and discussed prospect theory, which focuses on the study of the microscopic process of things and emphasizes that people's evaluation of information is often influenced by the profit and loss framing (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).

In some cases, the framing of an issue is how it changes over time, altering public perceptions of what is at stake and enabling the public to form their insights. Little is known about how such frameworks change and emerge, and even less is known about how they affect individuals and how time limits them.

Many studies on framing effects have been conducted on each subject in separate sessions and tested for impact shortly after contact communication. Future research on the framework effect should focus on the series of effects on the framework effect and how to guide the public to better understand and receive the flow of information. We will also

better discuss and study how the framing effect affects People's Daily learning and life, how different rates of forgetting affect the framing effect, and under what circumstances individuals are not affected by the manipulation of preference control.

Many people think the framing effect is through the passive change of different considerations of accessibility and work (Zaller, 1992). Nelson, Oxley & Clawson explain that the accessibility model "portrays the individual as rather unconscious in the sense that whatever thought pops into the mind will automatically be incorporated into the final attitude" (e.g., any thought implied by the frame) (Nelson *et al.*, 1997).

According to Feldman and Levin (1995), "Framing focuses attention on understanding a particular dimension (interpretation) of the problem... Framing highlights the links between the problem and specific considerations, increasing the likelihood of retrieving those considerations when thinking about the problem".

Similarly, Frisch (1993) applies the concept of the framing effect to experiments referring to it as the experimental result that individuals will react differently to the same decision problem depending on the description. The study of framing effects was originally intended to provide counterexamples to the prevailing theme of rational choice prevailing in the field at the time of Kahneman (2000). The interest paradigm has long been to present the same information to two different groups of people in two different formats and to show differences in choice. However, recently, attention has shifted to understanding how people organizational decisions, and this, in turn, how to influence the decision-making. Besides, the latter involves beyond precise clear operation and the choice of simple tasks, and more abundant data form and complexity.

A. Frame and Framing Effect

Frame refers to the mental model that an individual used to solve a decision problem (Johnson-Laird, 1983), which includes the details (i.e., information) of the elements of the decision problem as well as the context. In general, we refer to any of these different ways of looking at the same problem as different frameworks (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). From their perspective, frameworks are often spontaneous, the result of people's subconscious expression, but decision-makers can also carry out repeated research and thinking before creating a framework.

The early wave of research on framing effects was restrictive because its "framed" decision makers rather than studying the processes those decision makers used to produce the framing. In particular, consistent with specific principles, "decision makers are often quite passive and therefore tend to accept whatever framework is in front of them" (Kahneman, 2000). However, the strength of the early findings about

framing effects is quite striking, even for the researchers who discovered them first. Political scientist and communication scholars usually use this definition of a softer version in order to better capture the essence of political discourse (Therault, 1999).

In politics, framing effects are often seen as the result of elite groups' unilateral manipulation of the public, who, he notes, uncritical acceptance of any framing they receive, whether it is what they hear or see (Entman, 1993). So far, scholars have always been able to find and confirm this from previous studies, and whenever framing effects are mentioned, they tend to find it in countless studies. It is worth mentioning that successful framing effects are always easy to catch people's eyes. However, the results of the study show the clarity of the framework and the limitations of the system. In other words, the framing effect occurs not because elites try to manipulate the public, but because the public somehow entrusts them to the elites they trust for technical guidance. At the same time, for these elites, they use their expertise to sift through the frameworks and select those that need to be followed.

At the same time, to circumvent framing effects, some researchers have tried a range of different approaches and have provided justifications for these decisions. With this approach, people have to be deliberative, think through all the choices they make, and try to reduce the cognitive shortcuts that might arise in the decision-making process. A series of theories have shown that the basic way to help the public make good decisions is to guide them to think carefully and make decisions based on the situation presented, independent of any experience, whether that experience is from the past or from their own experience.

B. Framing and Prospect Theory

Kahneman & Tversky (1979) proposed a descriptive selection model called "prospect theory" to accommodate these observations, which differ from the norm theory. According to the prospect theory put forward by Kahneman & Tversky (1984), people tend to be risk averse when the expected result is profit (or profit), and risk seeking when the expected result is loss (or loss). The principle of loss aversion has become an indispensable and important principle in prospect theory, which points out that when people face loss, the psychological gap brought by the loss is often greater than the joy brought by the benefit. In other words, People tend to avoid risks in the face of positive and positive benefits when making decisions, while they are seeking more risks in the face of negative benefits. Compared to the pain caused by loss, the pleasure caused by equivalent gain is more intense, namely loss aversion.

They also believe that prospect theory provides a theoretical basis for the framing effect, which reveals that the reason why people always make irrational decisions is because people always act irrationally. For individual decision-making, it can be roughly divided into two aspects: editing and commenting. In the editing stage, decision-makers often edit, sort out, summarize, combine or decompose the information flow. And in the evaluation phase, decision-makers need according to the value function and the value of different options for different choice.

The development of prospect theory is a successful

innovation of combining theory and practice. It not only provides a theoretical basis for irrational choice, but also forms a unique set of assumptions about conflict and crisis compared with rational choice theory. With the deepening of research, scholars have found that prospect theory has the disadvantage of not fully explaining the framing effect. On the one hand, reference points and value functions are difficult to measure and estimate; On the other hand, differences in individual decisions cannot be reflected in prospect theory.

Although prospect theory offers plausible explanations for many important patterns of behavior, we need to provide a large number of empirical studies, provide sufficient theoretical basis for the prospect theory, make it become effective, behavior theory which can be promoted. As noted above, prospect theory does not provide a framing theory. At the empirical level, the main task was to determine how participants structured choice questions. Prospect theory provides little explanatory power to explain hypothetical choices independent of framing, loss aversion, and risk orientation.

There are many variations in the framework. However, as Levy (1997) points out, framing theory does not exist. Many observers claim that prospect theory, as a choice theory for testing, offers an alternative to expected utility.

C. Framing and Expected Utility Theory

Experts and scholars first put forward the theory of expected utility theory, and then came the theory of frame theory. The expected utility theory holds that in the case of uncertain potential risks, people should first evaluate all possible consequences of the decision, and then make the final decision.

Expected utility theory is a system, not a specific theory, is the main model of decision-making research since World War II. It and prospect theory dominate decision-making and judgment. This theory usually treats decision-makers as perfectly rational people who seek utility maximization and self-interest and follow the principles of rational behavior.

The expected utility theory mainly discusses and studies whether people's preset reference points will have a significant impact on people's expected choices, such as people's responses to risks, which are usually presented in a non-linear way.

However, not all of us can behave rationally in our daily lives because of limited knowledge. In the absence of expertise and unforeseen risks, individuals cannot make perfect decisions based on rational principles.

D. Framing and Loss Aversion

Soman (2004) believes that loss aversion means that people pay more attention to possible losses than potential gains, that is, the attractiveness of gains is not enough to compensate for the aversion to losses. For example, the psychological impact of losing \$1,000 is much greater than the amount of happiness gained from gaining \$1,000. This is a cognitive bias that also affects people's judgments and choices about other decisions. Loss aversion is universal and highly descriptive and can be found in quite a number of studies to analyze it, especially when it involves choices with or without risk, for example, status quo bias, endowment effect (Kahneman *et al.*, 1991).

People are more sensitive to losses than to gains of equal value. Simply put, people are more afraid of losing what they have than of gaining something of equal value, a phenomenon we call loss aversion. That is, the loss is greater than the gain when making a decision (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This is reflected in the fact that people are generally reluctant to bet on a fair coin toss. The attraction gained from possible gains is not enough to compensate for the aversion to possible losses. Similarly, redefining a “gain” gamble as a “loss” gamble alters choices, as shown in a classroom demonstration based on Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment.

Loss aversion may have an impact on People’s Daily life and decision-making, thus affecting people’s choices and causing people to have different cognitive biases. Framing effects have traditionally been studied in the context of information such as the gains people make, and the losses people accept (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). When results are presented as “interest,” information is considered beneficial. When results are presented as “cost,” information is viewed as a loss. This phenomenon is known as the framing effect, which originated from the study of the Asian disease problem conducted by Kahneman and Tversky. The study aimed to prevent an extremely deadly disease that was expected to claim the lives of 600 people. Two treatments were proposed to combat the disease, and the estimated results of each approach were as follows:

Some respondents (N = 152) then received the following scenario description:

(1) If Plan A is adopted, 200 people will be saved (72%).

(2) If Plan B is adopted, there is a 1/3 chance that 600 people will survive and a 2/3 chance that no one will survive (28%).

The results showed that of these respondents, 72% indicated A preference for Option A risk aversion.

Another group of respondents (N = 155) received the exact same scenario, except it used a mortality format:

(3) If Plan C is adopted, 400 people will die (22%).

(4) If Plan D is adopted, then the probability that no one will die is 1 in 3,600 and the probability that 600 people will die is 2 in 3 (78%).

The results showed that only 22% of respondents chose option C, even though option C, like option A, was a risk-averse option and option D, like option B, was a risk-seeking option.

We can find that these problems express the same meaning, just changed the way described. Scenarios 1 and 2 are the same, with the following description changed. It should be noted that the gains and losses here are entirely based on the reference point, which is not the same, and the way people make decisions will be different.

Thus, the unique uniqueness keyword in the favorable environment was described as survival, and the other group was described as death. Conversely, when the same choice is negative, people are more likely to anticipate their loss and become more willing to take risks. Tversky’s theory undoubtedly contributed to both the framing effect analysis and the study presented here.

II. FRAMING ON COMMUNICATIONS

Framing theory has been widely used in People’s Daily

communication and decision-making (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987). The framing effect also influences people’s discussion of international issues to varying degrees. believes that framing effect theory provides a concrete theoretical basis for decision-makers to interpret different political definitions (Shah *et al.*, 2002).

In theory, we expect the framing effect to diminish with the issue of active participation. In particular, when citizens are exposed to a variety of different points of view, the influence of biased statements on issues should be reduced. Competition enables access to a more representative sample of potential considerations than unilateral exchanges, thus providing a broader frame of reference for determining an individual’s preference on an issue. Just as bilateral survey questions produce more reliable responses, debates and electoral contests prompt people to assess the relevance of alternative reasons and help identify policies that align with their values.

We hope that a feature of public opinion will be increased stability and thus reduced sensitivity to framing under conditions of exposure to information on both sides of an issue. Over time, when citizens encounter a series of arguments around an issue through the media or in conversations, public opinion should solidify.

The stability of opinion, independent of the processes by which judgments are formed and maintained, is thus a misguided criterion for assessing the quality of political assessment. A stable attitude can reflect complex reasoning or dogmatism and rigidity. At one extreme, our citizens do not have a mature enough attitude, and they are often manipulated by different frames of the issue; At the other extreme, the attitudes of our citizens are so stubborn that they seek only to reinforce existing points of view, and every frame elicits the same closed response. It is not clear which public image is less desirable.

III. FRAMING EFFECTS ON ENTREPRENEURS’ DECISION-MAKING

When people are faced with a decision problem, they use a specific frame to form a mental representation of the problem, and it is this representation that they solve. Therefore, no study of decision making would be complete without studying the process by which individuals construct their problems and the factors that influence framing.

Framing structures have been widely used within the broad field of management and organization theory and have been extended to include the entire spectrum of cognitive, linguistic, and cultural processes in various organizational and institutional contexts. The widespread popularity and use of the concept have led to a rich stream of research, ranging from management cognition and decision-making work to strategic and organizational change, as well as social movements and institutions. At the same time, the popularity of framing in this literature has perhaps come at a cost.

Tversky & Kahneman (1981) argue that the extent to which the outcome of a decision is manipulated affects judgment and decision making. One of the most striking and controversial issues is “framing”, which deviates from rational decision theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). Normative models of rational decision making based on expected utility theory Baron (Baron, 2008). “Therefore,

decision outcomes need to conform to the principle of descriptive invariance (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).” The framing effect is widely used in human daily decision-making, which tends to cause cognitive bias in decision-making, thus affecting decision-making choices, and the violation of the invariance principle of description is identified as one of the strongest biases in decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Description invariance principles emphasize changes to the description of options, but they argue that the description options should not be modified by changing the order of preferences. That is, if a person decides to choose a treatment that has an 80% survival rate, then we can also understand that the person should still choose that treatment even if other experts describe the treatment as having a 20% mortality rate. However, studies have shown that even for the same problem, different ways of describing it will lead to different decisions, resulting in decision-making differences, which will affect people’s choices and decisions (Reyna, 2004). When people are presented with other descriptions and forms of choice, they tend to make different decisions, which is known as the framing effect. The invariance principle emphasizes that people should make different decisions based on various conditions, even if faced with the same problem and presented with other descriptions. People may sometimes make irrational judgments and choices based on their supervisors’ values.

Therefore, can decision-makers be trained to reframe? Researchers in the field of creativity and innovative thinking certainly think so (DeBono and Telesca, 1990), and research in the field of debias has suggested some cognitive strategies for refactoring. The importance of the decision and the level of participation are certainly potential drivers that may prompt refactoring. However, future research needs to address these and other factors in order to more fully understand how individuals construct simple decision-making problems.

IV. CONCLUSION

Framing effects involve having different attitudes toward what is logically or necessarily equivalent. Therefore, the framing effect that we are going to model involves having a different attitude toward equivalent propositions that are fully mastered because the content of these propositions is different. We acknowledge that this is not the only way the subject is framed: As a psychological phenomenon, framing may involve a variety of subtle pragmatic cues and mental associations triggered by word order, emphasis, etc. As we shall see, an oppositional logical approach different from ours may be better suited to framing modeling related to the subject’s grammatical sensitivity. The logic of our framing will represent these two roots.

In short, the framing effect always affects the different judgments and choices people make in different choices and situations in an orderly manner. Although the conclusion we get in this paper is still not comprehensive, it provides a theoretical basis for the study of frame effect. The framing effect not only has an important impact on people’s actual daily decision-making, but also has an impact on the risk choice situation under different circumstances.

A growing number of studies show that the framing effect

to reveal human choice and judgment provides a solid theoretical basis. However, these empirical findings are rarely discussed together in the existing literature. For a long time, we have been bombarded by an ever-increasing flow of information, which requires us to make good choices and judgments based on different options in our daily lives and decisions. For people, how we receive this information, how we respond to this information and how we choose it is a very useful study for our current research field. In the future, researchers can further study the impact by integrating all the information they receive, generalizing the questions raised by the information, and putting them together.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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